The Festival at the Water Hole: Rousseau, Freud and Derrida on Incest by Fourny, Diane R.
The Eighteenth Century, vol. 31, no. 2, 1990 
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The position of privilege that psychoanalytic theory continues to 
enjoy within literary critical discourse has been reinforced in 
recent years by deconstruction, which at one point in its history 
began to accept and incorporate psychoanalysis within its own 
practice.1 Gayatri Spivak has written with good reason that 
"Derrida implicates himself in the Freudian procedure of at-
tending to the detail of a text," since Freud's notion of 
reconstruction can be shown to be analogous in many respects 
to the Derridian project.2 Deconstruction 4 'reconstructs,'' as it 
decodes from the traces of the text, that which cannot be said.3 
In his reading of Rousseau's Essai sur I'origine des langues,4 
Derrida indeed proceeds in the fashion of the analyst, utilizing 
a Freudian perspective on incest and prohibition to interpret, 
in part, Rousseau's argument for a theory of culture (chapter 
IX of the Essai). Deciphering Rousseau's "unnamable" desire 
for the Mother and its subsequent repression, Derrida reads 
Rousseau's theory as one based on the Father's law, the first law 
being the prohibition of incest: 
La societe, la langue, l'histoire, 1'articulation, en un mot la supplementarite 
naissent done en meme temps que la prohibition de l'inceste. Celle-ci est 
la brisure entre la nature et la culture. (G, 375) 
A theoretical practice, the authority of which depends on 
something that is in principle 4'unknowable," would appear to 
be hermetically sealed and thus immune from criticism. How-
ever, the fact that this practice ultimately ''names" something 
for that8 'unknown''—that an authorial voice and a reading are 
established at one point, also means it has opened itself to 
criticism. Jacques Lacan found an amusing, if not also perplex-
ing, manner to explain the break in the hermetic seal of 
psychoanalytic practice when he declared: "we have no way of 
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knowing if the Unconscious exists outside of psychoanalysis."5 
The same might be said of Derrida's reading of Rousseau. 
This paper will question the Freudian interpretation of 
Rousseau's theory of culture as developed in De la grammatologie. 
By retracing Derrida's de constructive path, it becomes ap-
parent that his reconstruction is a fiction in which we find a 
Rousseau of Derrida's invention. As a post-Freudian reader of 
Rousseau, Derrida draws our attention to a problem (incest) 
that was of little and limited concern to Rousseau. He chooses 
to read incest not as Rousseau did, but rather the way Freud 
would later define it. His reading forces us to look at Rousseau's 
notion of Self through an arbitrary grid: internal, unconscious, 
unknowable (however, " t rue and original") subjectivity 
(presence), versus an external, conscious, articulated, and 
deferred subjectivity—in effect saying too much and too little 
about Rousseau's Self. By comparing Rousseau's text of the 
Essai with analogous texts from two other works (Discours sur 
Vorigine de Vinegalite parmi les hommes and the Premier Dialogue of 
Rousseau juge de Jean-Jacques), I hope to show that what Derrida 
has designated as the unnamable and "ungraspable limit" of 
society's founding, is in fact named by Rousseau as being a 
certain form of violence originating in desire.6 This rereading 
of Rousseau relies on a different psychological model of human 
desire than the one proposed by Freud/Derrida, and thus, my 
analysis will necessarily turn to Rene Girard and his theory of 
triangular desire.7 
1 
One of the fascinating aspects about Rousseau remains that 
well before the advent of psychoanalysis, he has already 
developed a theory of "being and otherness." Rousseau con-
structs a dialectical model of the Self divided into a personal, 
subjective and "natural" Self (Freud would later formulate the 
Unconscious for this division), and a socially formed, artificial 
Self. To this rather crude model, he was of course to add depth 
by developing it in three different directions: the political, the 
social, and the psychological. 
As defined in the Discours and later in the Contrat social, the 
political dimension expresses otherness as alienation: the in-
stigation of a system of ownership whereby man accepts his fate 
as that of the property of another. Within the social dimension, 
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the divided Self is measured in terms of its distance from a 
hypothetical, original state of being: the greater the distance, 
the greater man's needs, exchanges and relations grow—a sort 
of quantitative transfer of what is supposed to be part of the 
4 'natural' ' in Self, to a new space marked by the social or cultural 
body the Self has now incorporated. Rousseau's explanation of 
the psychological sphere leads him to develop a theory of 
human cognition: the psychic faculties—perception, memory, 
judgment and imagination—are themselves expressions of 
division since they seem to emerge from a learning experience 
that is fundamentally imitative. The social and psychological 
spheres are intrinsically bound in Rousseau's system and he 
indifferently describes their development and functions as 
simultaneous occurrences from one text to the next. This 
means that Rousseau will always speak of a theory of culture as 
a theory of Self, as well as a process of socialization. 
Derrida's study of chapter IX of the Essai reads Rousseau's 
theory of culture at this juncture of the psychical and social 
selves—the point or crossover from man's natural state of being 
to his social state. The juncture or "passage" from a pre-
reflexive, pre-social being to a divided, reflexive Self is ex-
pressed in the text as a fall from grace—or as Derrida puts it, a 
"rupture," a "reversal," a "revolution," "catastrophe," or 
"regression." 
This break marks a transition from man's wholeness of being 
in Nature to his degenerate state in Society. The catastrophic 
"rupture" serves as the catalyst setting in motion the human 
process Rousseau calls perfectibility. Derrida explains that 
Rousseau's catastrophic theory is an insoluble paradox: the 
accident ("flaw") causing man to fall away from Nature, neces-
sarily originates in Nature. The creation by Nature of such an 
"imperfection" unleashes the development (supplementarity) 
of man's virtual faculties, these being placed in motion only to 
repair the consequences of the accident. In other words, Der-
rida argues, a perfectly natural order created an imperfection in 
the form of an accident in order to allow for the development 
of man's (imperfect) faculties. Out of whole, continuous and 
pure being are born division, discontinuity, difference: 
La catastrophe ouvre le jeu du supplement parce qu'elle inscrit la 
difference locale . . . . La societe ne se cree que pour reparer les accidents 
de la nature . . . . La formation des societes a joue un role compensateur 
dans l'economie generale du monde. (G, 367,368) 
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Yet in order to explain this paradox, Derrida finds himself 
turning to metaphor, to a subjective reading: Rousseau's 
"acccident" or the providential "touch of the finger"—already 
metaphors themselves—are further obscured by the critic's 
rewriting. The acccident becomes a hidden, mysterious move-
ment: an ever-so-devious and slight turning; nothingness; a 
negativity; evil; and eventually death. By the end of his analysis, 
the accident has become the abyss of the unnamable desire for 
the Mother. How does Derrida move from the accident to an 
incestuous desire? 
Derrida selects a particular passage from the concluding 
pages of chapter IX of the Essai, which could be called "The 
Festival at the Water Hole" episode. In this text, Rousseau 
creates a bucolic drama, a paradise lost representing the last 
vestiges of man as a participant in the pure presence of the 
natural order. Around the water hole, shepherds and young 
maidens gather. Here, the domestic (instinctual) economy 
meets the public (social) economy for the first time. Eyes meet; 
the sight of new faces incites the need to meet more new faces. 
Rising out of these new urges, passion is born. More needs are 
developed, among which Rousseau assigns the need for expres-
sion—the origin of language. 
Now, Derrida will insist on the unreadability of the episode. 
The text only appears to interest him as it defines a before and 
after of the festival. He declares that since Rousseau "says 
nothing" about what has taken place during the festival 
ni en quoi consiste 1'in-difference du desir au plaisir, onpourra, si du moins 
on le veuty completer cette description des 4 premieres fetes'' et lever 
l'interdit qui pese encore sur elle. (G, 372; my italics) 
The "mystery" of the festival marking the birth of cultural 
order—of language, articulation, symbolic structure—is the first 
in a series of holes ("lacunae") Derrida uncovers and proceeds 
to repair. This is somewhat curious since, on the one hand, he 
acccuses Rousseau at one point of writing philosophical myths 
full of gaps: 
Et quand Thistoire est incapable de determiner ce fait ou les faits de cet 
ordre, la philosophie doit, par une sorte d'invention libre et mythique, 
produire des hypotheses factuelles jouant le meme role, expliquant le 
surgissement d'une nouvelle structure. (G, 365) 
On the other hand, Derrida proceeds in the very same man-
ner by plugging the Rousseauian "gap" with Freudian mythol-
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ogy. The reader is familiar with the logics he uses: the symbolic 
order is that of the male signifier, the Father's prohibition. The 
festival must thus represent the human order before the 
Father's prohibition (an order which cannot be expressed be-
cause we do not know what it is): the pre-Oedipal, the desire for 
the Mother, the era of the unnamable incest taking place. 
Derrida "completes the description" in this fashion, support-
ing his argument by quoting a passage directly following the 
festival episode. This text, we are told, holds the key to unlock-
ing the mystery, reveals the determining combination that one 
finds contained in the last sentence of the paragraph and its 
footnote on incest. The "in-difference" between desire and 
pleasure is found to reside in the continuous experience, the 
non-difference of incest. 
Yet read in context, it is not at all certain that the paragraph 
and footnote in question have been written as the development 
of the preceding paragraph. On the contrary, they more readily 
appear as one thought in a chain of ideas—a parenthetical 
comment of a sort. (Of course, the "parenthetical" or 
"marginal" comment is precisely the kind of text a deconstruc-
tive reading is apt to dwell upon; hence, Derrida's treatment of 
it as if it were a piece of dreamwork). Rousseau's point in 
bringing up the issue of the propagation of the human 
species—the subject of the incest paragraph—is to distinguish 
desire as Love ("du pur cristal des fontaines sortirent les 
premiers feux de l 'amour") from desire as instinct ("il y avait 
des mariages mais il n'y avait point d 'amour"). Rather than 
surreptitiously inscribing incest during the moment of the 
festival, Rousseau tries to clarify and define the point of origin 
or the interval between animality and culture. Yet, Derrida 
insists on reading the paragraph backwards, substituting " fires 
of love" with incestuous love between brother and sister. 
He also makes a great deal of the marginality of Rousseau's 
footnote on incest. But is it really out of place for an eighteenth-
century thinker, having just explained to his reader (in a most 
matter-of-fact manner) the necessity and (probable) historical 
reality of incest, to clarify himself on the matter of its subsequent 
prohibition? For Derrida, however, the footnote reveals 
Rousseau's moral "embarrassment'' among other things. This 
is merely the beginning of the reconstruction. The first lacuna 
having been filled (festival = incest), Derrida moves to another 
revealing "hole": the passage on incest is all the more sig-
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nificant since it has not mentioned the Mother but has sub-
stituted her with the sister: 
Cet enonce ne nomme pas la mere dans le texte de Rousseau. Mais il n'en 
montre que mieux la place Si Ton considere main tenant que lafemme 
naturelle (la nature, la mere ou si Von veut la soeur) est un represents ou un 
signifie remplace, supplee, dans le desir, c'est-a-dire dans la passion sociale, 
au-dela du besoin, nous avons la le seul represents, l'unique signifie que 
Rousseau, exaltant la saintete de l'interdit, prescrive de remplacer par son 
signifiant. . . . II y a done ici une impossibility de montrer la chose, mais 
cette impossibility n'est pas naturelle. Rousseau le dit lui-meme; elle n'est 
pas davantage un element de la culture parmi d'autres, puisqu'elle est un 
interdit sacre et universel. C'est l'element de la culture elle-meme, l'origine 
non declaree de la passion, de la societe, des langues: la premiere 
supplementary (G, 375-76, my italics) 
This statement could not be closer to the Freudian project, 
the task of the critic cum analyst being "to make out what has 
been forgotten from the traces which it has left behind, or more 
correctly to construct it."9 
It is interesting to note that Derrida obviously reads the voice 
of the text as that of a male subject (is this Rousseau's uncon-
scious speaking to us?), ignoring the fact that Rousseau's text 
never adopts a subjective point of view, never even speaks of a 
subject but always of subjects: multitudes of desiring, passionate 
subjects. But this does not seem to concern Derrida, who must 
invent the voice of the son; after all, the analyst requires an 
analysand. 
A third lacuna supposedly points to Rousseau's secret desire. 
The fact that incest has now been identified as the subject of 
the Festival episode, its glaring absence from the Contrat social 
makes its possibility all the more certain. An omission tells all: 
On peut done difficilement separer la prohibition de l'inceste (loi sacree, 
dit I'Essai) de V "ordre social", 4'droit sacre qui sert de base a tous les 
autres". Si cette sainte loi appartient a l'ordre meme du contrat social, 
pourquoi n'est-elle pas nomme dans Vexpose du Contrat social? Pourquoi 
n'apparait-elle que dans une note en bas de page, dans VEssai inedit? 
Tout permet en effet de respecter la coherence du discours theorique de 
Rousseau en reinscrivant la prohibition de l'inceste a cette place. Si elle est 
dite sacree quoique institute, c'est qu'elle est, quoiqu'instituee, universelle. 
C'est l'ordre universel de la culture. (G, 374) 
"The sacred and universal interdict," or the "element of 
culture itself," which has displaced the impossible relationship 
with the Mother and Nature, marks the necessary path Derrida's 
Rousseau must follow so that the emergence of culture may take 
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place. Yet, this path representing the origin is also one leading 
to corruption and death: 
En commeneant, (la societe) commence a se degrader . . . .Transcendant 
le besoin, la passion engendre de nouveaux besoins qui la corrompent a 
leur tour. La degradation post-originaire est analogue a la repetition 
pre-originaire. L'articulation, se substituant a la passion, restaure l'ordre 
du besoin. Le traite tient lieu d'amour. A peine essayee, la danse degenere. 
La fete aussitot devient la guerre. Et deja au point d'eau: 
"Les barbares surtout, qui vivent de leur troupeaux, ont besoin 
d'abreuvoirs communs, et l'histoire des plus anciens temps nous 
apprend qu'en effet c'est la que commencerent et leurs traites et leurs 
querelles." (G, 377) 
Derrida's journey has taken his reader to Beyond the Pleasure 
Principle: the unnamable trace translates Eros, and its corruption, 
Thanatos. 
To summarize, Derrida has reconstructed Rousseau's theory 
of the founding processes of society by reading it through the 
Oedipal complex. Using "The Festival at the Water Hole" 
episode, he accomplishes his analysis by (1) identifying certain 
gaps or "lacunae" and supplying them with content; (2) sub-
stituting one word for another (Mother for Nature and sister; 
son for brother); (3) subjectively interpreting Rousseau's foot-
note on incest as a moral "embarrassment"; (4) assigning the 
text a (male) voice;10 and (5) transposing the order of 
Rousseau's text of war, disputes and treatises (above citation), 
which gives the reader the impression that Rousseau inscribed 
violence in the socializing process after the festival takes place 
when, in fact, Rousseau made these remarks in a text preceding 
the festival passage. Should we accept Derrida's reconstruction 
of the festival episode since it seems to fit so well Freud's model 
of repressed desire? For that matter, should we accept Freud's 
model of incestuous desire? 
It does not seem out of place to question certain suspicious 
phrases found in Derrida's text, such as "if we wish to," "com-
plete the description," "all the better" or an entire sentence 
such as the following: 
On sera d'autant moins surpris par l'omission de l'inceste dans revocation 
de la fete qu'on aura prete attention a une autre lacune, si courant il est 
vrai: decrivant la non-prohibition . . . . (G, 372) 
I would suggest that Rousseau does tell what occurred during 
the festival. In fact, it is this interval that represents the core of 
his analysis. However, we must follow Rousseau's path directly 
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by reading his text rather than taking an oblique path that leads 
somewhere down under, to Freud's or Derrida's texts. Ironical-
ly, Derrida names what occurs at the water hole; however, he 
ironically chooses not to "read" himself. He names it when he 
repeats yet fails to explain the term, social passion. What does 
Rousseau mean by it? Desire among others? For others? With 
others? Derrida names it without assigning it significance as he 
concludes that the movement of supplementarity is expressed 
not as a replacement but as a reversal1 'by which the poles substitute 
each other by turn." Finally, he names it when he takes the liberty 
to rearrange the order of Rousseau's texts (at taching 
Rousseau's comment on war at the end) which, in effect, writes 
a new conclusion to chapter IX of the Essai. Derrida's "the 
festival becomes war" dissimulates the text's own logic that 
precedes the festival with war: violence, disputes and treatises 
(Law) precede the prohibition of incest. 
What Derrida calls and perhaps hides by repea t ing 
Rousseau's social passion is what Girard would identify as con-
flicting mimesis: passion developed from need caught in a social 
context of rivalry. It defines desire as subject-directed (desire 
for the other) rather than object-oriented: a "catastrophic" 
desire to be sure—a crisis of indifferentiation that necessarily 
begins and ends in violence. 
I am not dealing with Derrida's notion of differance in an 
ontological sense since I have chosen to address that part of De 
la grammatologie in which Derrida purposely chooses to use 
Freudian theory as a tool to unravel Rousseau's longing or 
expression for an originary presence of the Mother: that is, as 
Derrida interprets it, Rousseau can only express this presence 
as a chain of deferred experiences in the form of the festival. 
The identity of this originary presence can only be expressed by 
its difference from or radical alterity to the moment before or 
after its presence, only "sous rature." Using psychoanalysis as 
a tool, this trace can be conceived (incompletely) as Freud's 
trace-structure of a purely unknowable, unconscious desire 
(incest): all we can ever know is the difference from that trace, 
itself unknowable. In other words, Derrida renders difference 
an absolute and sets it apart. Whereas Derrida absolutizes dif-
ference, Girard systematizes it: in effect identity or presence is 
that play between difference and identity. 
It is necessary, therefore, to begin rereading Rousseau's text 
as it is written: Law or the prohibition of incest is the desire for 
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the sister, not the mother: the sister is the object of desire caught 
between brothers, or between father and son, or merely be-
tween rivals (as Rousseau semed to intuit—it makes no dif-
ference here who the players are). This means we must begin 
our analysis at the origin of passion, for it is surely passion that 
begins all. Moreover, by reading Rousseau's pastoral romance 
in its three versions, the development of a theory of culture 
based on the problem of conflicting desire becomes clear. To 
attempt such an argument, I propose to use Rousseau to 
"complete" Rousseau: reinscribing the Festival episode in the 
Discours and the Dialogues. 
2 
As Ernst Cassirer emphasized in his short but powerful essay, 
The Question of Jean-Jacques Rousseau, Rouseau was an obsessively 
methodical and repetitive thinker.11 Each of his major works 
reformulates a common core of principles, or what Rousseau 
himself called his "Systeme." It thus comes as no surprise to 
find the festival theme resurfacing in several works, although 
somewhat modified as the author refines his theories. Here, 
along with Chapter IX of the Essai, I will study two of these 
recurrences: the "Festival at the Tree" episode in the Discours, 
and the "Tableau of Nature" in the Premier Dialogue. The two 
earlier texts situate the festival in primitive man's hypothetical 
past, whereas the Dialogue text places the idealized "paradise 
lost" in a hypothetical present or future. All three texts develop 
the same atmosphere of euphoria and celebration and depict 
subjects participating in the plenitude of Nature, in the "pure 
presence" of being which lies somewhere outside of space and 
time. By comparing the repetitions in the texts, a picture 
emerges of the phenomenon we have isolated as social passion 
that has little to do with the problem of incest, and yet every-
thing to do with a conflictual desire. Comparing and collating 
these common notions and terms of the three episodes will 
enable us to bring Rousseau's theory of culture into better 
focus, that is, will help reveal what has taken place during the 
festival. 
THE FIRES OF LOVE, OR THE BIRTH OF PASSION 
The Setting. A water hole, an old tree, utopia-each of the 
three texts situates its players and action in an idealized state of 
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Nature. The manner in which Derrida described this state leads 
us to imagine Nature as a continuum, a pure and unbroken 
presence: "Avant la fete, il n'y a pas, dans l'etat de pure nature, 
d' experience du continu; apres la fete commence l'experience du 
discontinu" (G, 372). "Unfettered nature," Rousseau's "per-
petual spring" is a non-moment, a perfect stasis. Imitating 
Nature because he is a part of it, man's original state is also one 
of inertia and indolence. Only by chance does an accident 
suddenly violate this continuous moment, planting the germs 
of degeneracy that will necessitate Nature's reordering of itself. 
But is this an accurate picture of Nature according to the text? 
Does Rousseau paint it as a perfectly continual and balanced 
moment suddenly succumbing to some "natural" rupturing? 
The Dialogue text offers a somewhat different image of Nature, 
clouding the pristine waters of the Essai text: 
Figurez-vous done un monde ideal semblable au notre, et neanmoins tout 
different. La nature y est la meme que sur notre terre, mais l'economie en 
est plus sensible, l'ordre en est plus marque, le spectacle plus admirable; 
les formes sont plus elegantes, les couleurs plus vives, les odeurs plus suaves, 
tous les objets plus interessants. Toute la nature y est si belle que sa 
contemplation enflammant les ames d'amour pour un si touchant tableau 
leur inspire avec le desir de concourir a ce beau systeme la crainte d'en 
troubler l'harmonie, et de la nait une exquise sensibilite qui donne a ceux 
qui en sont doues des jouissances immediates . . . . Les passions y sont 
comme ici le mobile de toute action, mais plus vives, plus ardentes, ou 
seulement plus simples et plus pures, elles prennent par cela seul un 
caractere tout different. (Dialogue, 668) 
Though terms approaching the sense of continuum and 
stability are to be found in the text, they do not dominate it. 
Contrary to an atmosphere of serenity, one senses exacerbation, 
as if Nature were stretching beyond itself. Its perfection spills 
over the limits of its own definition as a perfect space. 
Rousseau's tableau describes Nature as an over-abundancce, an 
over-perfection, a too-full plenitude, a more-present presence. 
Hardly the model of balance and harmony, Nature has become 
a disturbance, moreover, it has becomes an aggravation inciting 
desire in its onlookers to compete with it, to be like it, to imitate 
its perfection-in other words, its difference. Men's more-than-
passionate desires become mere reproductions of Nature: the 
repetitive use of the superlative difference (superlatum = ce qui 
est porte au-dessus, i.e. Vexces) acts as a contagion or inflamma-
tion (enflammant) resulting in its mimetic doubling by man. 
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In fact, this portrayal of a disturbed and disturbing Nature 
has been developed in an earlier passage of chapter IX of the 
Essai, allowing us to link the settings of the two texts:12 
Le premier etat de la terre differait beaucoup de celui ou elle est 
aujourd'hui qu'on la voit paree ou defiguree par la main des hommes. Le 
chaos, que les poetes ont feint dans les elements, regnait dans ses 
productions. Dans ces temps recules, ou les revolutions etaient frequentes, 
ou mille accidents changeaient la nature du sol et les aspects du terrain, 
tout croissait confusement, arbres, legumes, arbrissaux, herbages: nulle 
espece n'avait le temps de s'emparer du terrain qui lui convenait le mieux 
et d'y etouffer les autres; elles se separaient lentement peu a peu; et puis 
un bouleversement survenait qui confondait tout. (Essai, 218) 
Nature as chaos is marked by an indifferentiated, wild growth 
of vegetation. Chaos precedes the "brisure"; in other words, 
upheaval represents an inherent quality belonging to the 
natural order. Furthermore, the natural order is fraught with 
competition and conflict wherein species must appropriate 
territory at the expense or extermination of rival species. If one 
wishes to speak of a continuum here, it can only be in terms of 
the repetitive or continual state of discontinuity. The rupture 
is a catastrophe bringing confusion to an already confused and 
chaotic world. 
In the Essai and Discours, episodes in which Nature has been 
metonymically reduced to a fountain or a tree, this presence of 
an inherent disordering is reproduced in the human order of 
need and desire. In the Essai, disordering is expressed as an 
imbalance, as both a lack and a surplus. Water becomes more 
necessary, the animals are thirstier, gestures are less adequate, 
feet jump instead of walk, new faces and objects produce more 
desires for newer faces and objects, and pleasure and desire are 
confused. In the Discours, feeling and ideas stack up one after 
the other, social relations "spread out" as family ties becomes 
"tighter," and lazy crowds of women seem suddenly animated 
with dance and song. Rousseau's idea of Nature and of man's 
natural state is thus variously expressed as chaos, excess, im-
balance, contagion and competition. The relationship between 
Nature and man is symbiotic: chaos is to Nature what passion is 
to man. Rousseau intuited only too well that passion, like 
Nature, is fundamentally violent and conflictual.13 
The Actors. Although Rousseau in a sense recreated a secular 
garden of Eden, he did not reinvent the original couple. The 
couple per se (mother/son; sister/brother; lovers) does not 
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interest him; nor does he concern himself with them in his 
comments on incest. As mentioned earlier, Rousseau's text 
does not adopt a subjective point of view—there are no Ids or 
Egos to speak of who would themselves speak. It seems risky, 
therefore, to develop a model of incestuous desire or to speak 
of a trace of a desire engraved on an " I " when there is no 
particular subject or couple to whom one may attach this desire 
or assign the trace. 
Subjects. Subjects do exist, however, yet only in multitudes. 
Either Rousseau addresses categories (men, women, young 
people, boys and girls) or he uses the impersonal "one." His 
subjects are often metonymically reduced to eyes, passions, 
developments of the heart, the voice, or the feet, or metaphori-
cally compared to projectiles in a game (in the Dialogues, pas-
sions are compared to something like the balls in a game of 
billiards). Rousseau's analysis of the birth of culture forcibly 
relies on the intersubjective context rather than on the individual 
psyche. Therefore, any "character" development or action will 
necessarily entail at least two subjects—if not a crowd—caught 
between a common desire. 
More interestingly, however, Rousseau works with a par-
ticular number or configuration of characters which one might 
describe as threesomes (or multiples of three). The "first fires 
of love" are not born of the amorous couple, but rather, of the 
couple plus the jealous rival: 
A force de se voir on ne peut plus se passer de se voir encore. Un sentiment 
tendre et doux s'insinue dans l'ame et par la moindre opposition devient 
une fureur impetueuse: la jalousie s'eveille avec l'amour; la Discorde 
triomphe, et la plus douce des passions re^oit des sacrifices de sang humain. 
(Essai) 
Opposition and jealously can only point to an Other, a rival. 
(It seems obvious that "human blood" here does not refer to a 
despondent lover's suicide, but to the violent spilling of blood 
between enemy subjects over a common object of dispute). 
More importantly, violent identity develops with the emergence 
of desire and is not distinguishable from it. The conflictual 
nature of love is due to its necessary and natural situation 
between two subjects who desire the same object. 
This conflictual "triangle" is more explicitly shown on four 
occasions in the Dialogue text. Our first example posits human 
desire as a force or energy: 
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. . . mais bientot manquant de force pour suivre a travers tant de resistance 
leur premiere direction, ils se laissaient deflechir par mille obstacles qui les 
detournant du vrai but leur font prendre des routes obliques . . . cet effet 
vient principalement de la faiblesse de l'ame qui suivant mollement 
l'impulsion de la nature, se detourne au choc d'un obstacle comme une 
boule prend Tangle de reflexion; au lieu que celle qui suit plus 
vigoureusement sa course ne se detourne point mais comme un boulet de 
canon, force l'obstacle ou s'amortit et tombe a sa rencontre. (Dialogue, 669) 
Again, we find the triangular configuration: subject-object 
(i.e., "goal") - obstacle. However, in the above text, the author 
has chosen to emphasize the conflict between subject and 
obstacle rather than to focus on the amorous couple. Further-
more, violence is no longer described as a jealous fury but as a 
disfigurement or death. 
In a second example, the opposition between subject and 
obstacle moves even closer to center stage while the object 
recedes to the background: 
. . . quand, detournees de leur objet par des obstacles, (les passions 
primitives) s'occupent plus de l'obstacle pour l'ecarter que de l'objet pour 
l'atteindre, alors elles changent de nature et deviennent irascibles et 
haineuses. (Dialogue, 669) 
The object has disappeared altogether while jealousy has now 
become the expression of hatred. Emphasis now clearly focuses 
on the conflict between the desire and its obstacle. Moreover, 
we sense that desire concentrates its primary energy on its 
obstacle and that the object is now entirely secondary. 
In a third example, Rousseau's rather abstract description of 
desire as a projectile becomes more tangible as he returns to 
the human sphere: 
Dans la societe humaine, si tot que la foule des passions et des prejuges 
qu'elle engendre a fait prendre le change a l'homme, et que les obstacles 
qu'elle entasse Font detourne du vrai but de notre vie, tout ce que peut 
faire le sage, battu du choc continuel des passions d'autrui et des siennes, 
et parmi tant de directions qui l'egarent ne pouvant plus demeler celle qui 
le conduisait bien, c'est de se tirer de la foule . . . il ne se tourmente point 
a leur rendre mal pour mal, outrage pour outrage. (Dialogue,, 669-70) 
Lesage/le vrai but/les passions d'autrui. The triangle of conflic-
tual desire ever more poignantly points to the violence it 
creates: jealousy and hatred express themselves as folly, blind-
ness, malice, and vengeance. Desire has moved toward a con-
tagion as the jealousy of the rival spreads to family, friends, the 
crowd. The hostile obstacle finally grows into an angry mob and 
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its violence has also become reciprocal: an eye for an eye, a tooth 
for a tooth, mal pour mal, outrage pour outrage. 
The Action. The three works we have been examining have 
already raised questions concerning desire, conflict and iden-
tification—questions that will become more pertinent as we 
move closer to what actually occurs at the festival. It is obvious 
that the action of each text involves sexual desire; however, 
non-sexual actions involving public esteem and prestige are just 
as important. Rousseau defines the benefits of desire in various 
terms as "passions," "plaisir," or "bonheur," these being 
sometimes synonymous with, sometimes contrary to, desire. By 
pleasure, he usually means the gratification of an instinct or 
need, with "jouissancce" or "bonheur" serving as synonyms. 
He sometimes uses "les passions" to mean the instincts, but 
most often he uses the term to describe desire. In the Dialogue 
text, he has clearly made a distinction between his first meaning 
of passion as an instinctual drive, and his more frequent use of 
it as desire. "Les passions primitives" are those which "lead 
(our actions) most directly to our conservation and happiness." 
In contrast, "les passions secondaires" (also called "relative," 
"deflected" or "side-tracked" desires) fix their energy on the 
obstacles (that is, on the passions of the Other) to that happi-
ness. What could Rousseau mean by desire's obsession with its 
obstacle, and how and why does desire turn into hate when it 
began as love? 
Rene Girard has suggested that desire, like other activities of 
the psyche, is an acquired or learned activity. Since all learning 
involves imitative processes, the origin of desire is thus said to 
be mimetic™ An important aspect of man's behavior also 
depends on his "dimension acquisitive" or what Girard calls a 
behavior of appropriation.15 A subject desires a certain object or 
goal (desires to "appropriate" it) not because the object itself 
is desirable but because it is desired—and perhaps possessed— 
by another subject. Desire is not self-created nor does it 
originate in the object; it exists as the desire of the Other, 
imitated and repeated.16 
It is interesting to note the importance Rousseau attaches 
throughout his work to learning as a fundamentally imitative 
and repetitive process. The difference between man's primitive 
or prereflexive state and his "rational" state represents only so 
many mimetic movements of the mind. As he declares in the 
Emile, for example, that which differentiates man from animal 
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is the faculty to perceive, compare and imitate things around 
him; he incorporates those qualities of the external world that 
best serve his needs: 
Les premiers mouvements naturels de l'homme etant de se mesurer avec 
tout ce qui l'environne et d'eprouver dans chaque objet qu'il apergoit 
toutes les qualites sensibles qui peuvent se rapporter a lui, sa premiere etude 
est une sorte de physique experimentale relative asapropre conservation.17 
By imitating the movements of Nature which first appear before 
him, man's cognitive faculties begin to develop: 
A mesure que le genre humain s'etendit, les peines se multiplierent avec 
les hommes. La difference des terrains, des climats, des saisons, put les 
forcer a en mettre dans leurs manieres de vivre. Des annees steriles, des 
hivers longs et rudes, des etes brulants qui consument tout, exigerent d'eux 
une nouvelle industrie. Le long de la mer, et des rivieres ils inventerent la 
ligne, et le hame^on. . . . Le tonnerre, un volcan, ou quelque heureux 
hazard leur fit connaitre le feu, nouvelle ressource contre la rigueur de 
l'hiver: ils apprirent a conserver cet element, puis a le reproduire. (Discours, 
165) 
However, the "qualities" man appropriates and reproduces 
for his own use are precisely those which imitate the forces—one 
might say, the violence—of Nature. As one species among 
many, and part of Nature's chaotic order, man learns to imitate 
the violence of Nature that serves his needs in the competition 
for survival. Out of the repetition of imitated processes, man 
also develops m o r e complex percept ions , his first or 
"primitive" ideas being perceptions of relationship. Perceptions 
of relationship translate man's ability to perceive difference in 
sameness (large and small, strong and weak, slow and fast, 
cowardly and courageous, and so forth): 
Cette application reiteree des etres divers a lui-meme et les uns aux autres, 
dut naturellement engendrer dans l'esprit de Fhomme les perceptions de 
certains rapports. Ces relations que nous exprimons par les mots de grand, 
de petit, de fort, de faible, de vite, de lent, de peureux, de hardi, et d'autres 
idees pareilles, comparees au besoin, et presque sans y songer, produisirent 
enfin chez lui quelque sorte de reflexion. (Discours, 165) 
Yet, these new ideas of relationship are in themselves objects 
of imitation and appropriation. For, along with his ability to 
perceive relationships or what he later calls "rank," he also 
comes to identify himself with that difference.18 
In the final analysis, however, difference is nothing other 
than the mark of violence. Rousseau also adds that perceiving 
relationship and difference emerges as the "competition" for 
space, objects and survival becomes more intense. That is, as 
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the number of other subjects and objects multiply within the 
same area, the more conducive the environment becomes for 
the development of violent differentiation. As part of the con-
flictual movement of Nature, man develops his reflexive facul-
ties by learning to imitate and incorporate (appropriate) the 
violence necessary for his survival. Perception, memory, im-
agination and judgment together perceive compare, juxtapose, 
incorporate, repeat, and copy the "qualities" or objects of his 
surroundings to ensure his well-being. 
Returning to our texts, we find that desire (sexual or for 
prestige) develops from the imitative and acquisitive properties 
of perception: 
On s'accoutuma a considerer differents objets, et a faire des comparaisons; 
on acquiert insensiblement des idees de merite et de beaute qui produisent 
des sentiments de preference. A force de se voir, on ne peut plus se passer 
de se voir encore. Un sentiment tendre et doux s'insinue dans Tame. . . . 
(Discours, 169) 
La, des yeux accoutumes aux memes objets des l'enfance, commencerent 
d'en voir de plus doux. Le coeur s'emeut e ces nouveaux objects (Essai, 
222) 
On s'accoutuma a s'assembler devant les cabanes ou autour d'un grand 
arbre Chacun commen^a a regarder les autres et a vouloir etre regarde 
soi-meme, et l'estime public eut un prix. . . . Sitot que les hommes eurent 
commence a s'apprecier mutuellement et que l'idee de la consideration fut 
formee dans leur esprit, chacun y pretendait y avoir droit. (Discours, 169) 
. . . voila comment l'amour de soi, qui est un sentiment bon et absolu, 
devient amour-propre; c'est-a-dire, un sentiment relauf par lequel on se 
compare, qui demande des preferences dont la jouissance est purement 
negative. . . . (Dialogue, 669) 
Imitation is like a contagion; perceptions, objects, subjects mul-
tiply, intensifying the competition for survival, happiness or 
gratification of desire, within a "space" that becomes more and 
more constrained. If only it could be controlled, checked, "held 
back," then preference or the difference leading to violence 
would never develop: "lui (l'homme) dans son etat primitif, 
lorsque place par la nature a des distances egalesde la stupidite des 
brutes et des lumieres funestes de l 'homme civil, et borne 
egalementpsx l'instinct et par la raison a se garantir du mal qui 
le menace, il est retenu par la pitie naturelle de faire lui-meme 
du mal a personne" (Discours, my italics). 
If desire is part of this mimetic process, it is thus conflictual 
in nature and perceived to be a source of disorder within the 
f o u r n y — o n i n c e s t 153 
community, since the appropriation of objects (or goals) neces-
sarily entails the exercise of force or violence between subjects. 
Thus, to continue to focus on a specific form of desire (incest) 
or on the objector goal desired (the Mother) is to misapprehend 
the nature of desire and the social problems it poses in 
Rousseau's work. If desire is not the expression of a want but 
rather, the imitated desire of another, it must be understood as 
the desire to be like the Other,. We thus move closer to desire's 
veritable object which is the Other—or more accurately, the very 
being of the Other. Again, it should be emphasized that desire 
cannot be understood outside its intersubjective, social dimen-
sion, nor is the mimetic process limited to merely two rivals; on 
the contrary, it invariably grows to include a multitude of 
subjects, violence begetting violence. Violence based on rivalry 
ensures vengeance, and like an illness, spreads through the 
community unchecked until it is deadened (temporarily) by a 
superior violence or arbitrarily interrupted by the authority of 
"sacred" institutions, such as prohibition and ritual.19 
We can now trace the development of what comes very close 
to a triangular desire and the role it plays in Rousseau's theory 
of culture. It should by now be clear that in the Dialogue, a desire 
"naturally" tending toward a given object or goal is always 
already inscribed within a conflict of rivalry. Between the desire 
and its object, there is always already present an obstacle, an 
equally opposing desire: 
Tous les premiers mouvements de la nature sont bons et droits . . . mais 
bientot manquant de force pour suivre a travers tant de resistance leur 
premiere direction (toward the object), ils se laissent deflechir par mille 
obstacles qui les detournent du vrai but leur font prendre des routes 
obliques. 
. . . celle (une boule, i.e. un desir) qui suit plus vigoureusement sa course 
ne se detourne point, mais comme un boulet de canon force l'obstacle ou 
s'amortit et tombe a sa rencontre. 
. . . l 'homme battu du choc continuel des passions d'autrui et des siennes 
. . . parmi tant de directions qui l'egarent. 
Deux amants, Tun tres epris, l'autre assez tiede, souffriront neanmoins un 
rival avec la meme impatience. 
In fact, the opposing desire reveals itself to be the true object 
preoccupying the two subjects, and the stronger the "resis-
tance," that is, the stronger the mimetic play, the less important 
the initial object becomes, to the point at which it disappears 
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entirely, leaving the two rival parties alone: Deux amants . . . 
souffriront neanmoins un rival avec la meme impatience . . . il 
peut tres bien arriver que la haine du second devenue sa passion 
principale, survive a son amour et meme s'accroisse apres qu'il 
(= l'amour pour l'object) est eteint" (Dialogue, 670). 
In the Discours, the crisis of mimetic desire touches not only 
sexual objects but also objects of prestige. We find another 
outbreak of it in the form of a desire for public esteem: 
Chacun commen^a a regarder les autres et a vouloir etre regarde soi-meme, 
et Testime publique eut un prix. Celui qui chantait ou dansait le mieux; le 
plus beau, le plus fort, le plus adroit, ou le plus eloquent devint le plus 
considere, et ce fut le premier pas vers l'inegalite, et vers le vice en meme 
temps: de ces premieres preferences naquirent d'un cote la vanite et le 
mepris, de l'autre la honte et l'envie; et la fermentation causee par ces 
nouveaux levains produisit enfin des composes funestes au bonheur et a 
l'innocence. (169) 
Not only does this passage clearly exhibit the crisis of mimetic 
desire as a crisis of violence, the reference to dance and song 
necessarily ties it to the Festival episode of the Essai text. It 
allows us to read "les pieds bondissaient," "la voix. . . d'accents 
passionnes," and "le geste empresse" as the same text. It is now 
possible to read the Festival episode and identify what Derrida 
isolated as "social passion." 
3 
At the outset of this study, I argued against Derrida's 
Freudian reading of incest and its prohibition, which sees this 
phenomenon at the center of the Festival episode, and the 
importance he places on it in Rousseau's development of a 
theory of culture. By emphasizing the before (incest) and after 
(prohibition) of the Festival, he reduced the episode itself to an 
unreadable "blank." By psychoanalytically "constructing" the 
festival as a present absence, he compared it to the Uncon-
scious: the Unconscious always already inscribed with the 
presence or "trace" of a culpable desire—hence, the Festival or 
origin of society is always already inscribed with its degraded, 
corrupted origin. Even if we were to agree with Derrida that 
incest does occur during the Festival, this would not change the 
outcome of our analysis. 
It is not Freud's culpable desire for the Mother that is present 
here. Nor does it matter that we may never be able to define 
this incest (although Rousseau did choose to define it as incest 
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among siblings). In each of the three texts, we have found it to 
be a question of the birth of desire, which is tied to intersubjec-
tivity. In the final analysis, desire is violence—the violence of the 
Other mimetically reciprocated in a spiraling effect. As the 
crisis of violence builds, order and difference deteriorate to the 
point where violence becomes indifferently inflicted, touching 
not only rivals as enemies but also friends and family. If incest 
has suggested itself to Rousseau at the close of the Festival 
episode, it is because incest (like parricide and other extreme 
forms of social violence) epitomizes the purest, most acute form 
of the mimetic crisis to strike the community: violence becomes 
an issue between the very subjects least likely to becomes rivals 
(fathers, sons, brothers). 
Rousseau understood that the fundamental issue before the 
question of the origin of society remained that of "les passions" 
or what today we call desire. He attempted to describe the 
nature of desire and the role it played in society's development 
by returning to its hypothetical inception. What he stumbled 
upon—perhaps without fully comprehending—became a 
problematic form of desire, always already caught in a conflictual 
movement of opposing forces. Furthermore, he found that it 
is the very nature of desire to act both as humankind's demise 
(since it represents an eventual cause for social violence to 
break out) and its triumph (since it also serves as the catalyst for 
the socializing processes to begin in the first place). Rousseau 
tried to explain the paradoxical intuition by returning to the 
origin of human faculties, in effect, building his own cognitive 
science based on identification and imitation. For Rousseau, 
human thought develops through processes of identification 
similar to those described as desire: primitive man learns by 
imitating the forces of Nature (its violence) that best serve his 
conservation and needs. This does not resolve the problem of 
origin for him, since his analysis has merely transferred the 
process of mimetic desire onto Nature, whereby Nature 
metaphorically plays the role of man's rival. Yet what is new and 
central to the analysis is the recognition and place Rousseau 
awards to identification and conflict within the cognitive proces-
ses. Perception, memory, judgment, and imagination—be-
cause they are essentially imitative faculties—result in the 
framing of man's world as a universe of comparison, preference, 
hierarchy—that is, difference. 
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If the origin of society (of language, inequality, and law) 
seems to escape Rousseau's investigation, it may be due to the 
fact that he constantly skirts the issue of religion, or more 
precisely, the sacred (as Derrida has brought to our attention 
with reason). But this is an attitude for which one can hardly 
blame Rousseau, hounded by the secular parochialism of the 
eighteenth century. If he seems to ignore the issue most of the 
time, the closer he moves toward the question of origin, the 
more religion nevertheless insinuates itself in his argument. He 
somehow cannot help but come back to it, though sacrality is 
transformed and transferred to the realm of secular law, becom-
ing the first and only legitimate Contract. (This is what Derrida 
tried to show us in the prohibition of incest: the "first" sacred 
law founding society.) In fact, in the Discours (in a passage 
separate from the Festival episode) he clearly expresses the 
necessary inclusion of the sacred in the founding of society: 
. . . les Gouvernements humains avaient besoin d'une base plus solide que 
la seule raison, et combien il etait necessaire au repos public que la volonte 
divine intervint pour donner a l'autorite souveraine un caractere sacre et 
inviolable qui otat aux sujets le funeste Droit d'en disposer. Quand la 
religion n'aurait fait que ce bien aux hommes, e'en serait assez pour qu'ils 
dussent tous la cherir et l'adopter, meme avec ses abus, puisqu'elle epargne 
encore plus de sang que le fanatisme n'en fait couler. (Dis^.,186) 
If we accept the thesis that the appearance of incest and its 
prohibition in the Essai is not a mere coincidence, and consider 
the above passage from the Discours, it then seems evident that 
Rousseau speculated on the necessity of the sacred function in 
the development of society: its prohibitions as well as its 
"abuses." Prohibition marked differenceby defining the limits 
of human violence; it denied men access to certain objects that 
seemed to stimulate outbursts of disorder. It defined difference 
by designating the prohibited objects as sacred, in other words, 
as the property of a transcendent (or more powerful) authority. 
And the "abuses" Prohibition is not the only manifestation 
of the sacred. As we have briefly mentioned in passing (see note 
19), Girard points to its second, more problematic manifesta-
tion: ritual sacrifice. Whereas prohibition attempts to prevent 
the violence of a mimetic crisis by assigning a sacred dimension 
to the mark of difference that it attempts to reestablish, ritual 
sacrifice creates the difference, creates violence in the form of 
sacrifice while the community is already in the midst of a crisis 
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of violence. As the reader knows, ritual sacrifice polarizes latent 
violence, focusing it on a scapegoat so that the community will 
be spared a greater outbreak of violence. By designating a 
unique victim or scapegoat, it polarizes the collective violence 
upon one, arbitrarily ' 'culpable" victim whose death or expul-
sion from the group expels the violence infesting the com-
munity. 
It may be argued that since Rousseau never clearly develops 
a notion of sacrifice in the texts we have been examining, his 
analysis of the origin of society does not really conform to or 
"hint at" Girard's theories concerning desire, violence, and the 
sacred. After all, the sacrificial mechanism plays a key part, if 
not the key role, in Girard's system, and its exclusion would 
undo his theory and perhaps our analysis. 
If Rousseau blinds himself to the notion of sacrifice in the 
Essai or the Discours, it is because the point of view of his 
argument remains on the side of violence rather than on the 
side of innocence. Rousseau's theory is itself caught in the play of 
mimetic desire. While he exposes the scandal of desire as the seat 
of the socializing process, he does so only to condemn culture 
and its theoretical allies. However, in some texts, his remark-
able intuitions do take him to the verge of a "sacrificial" 
mechanism.20 The Dialogue texts we examined represent one of 
those instances. In it, we discover that Rousseau's "ideal world" 
populated by subjects whose "primitive" desires are pure, good, 
and right (i.e., non-violent), is none other than the world of 
sacrifice. It is the utopic universe of the victim where desire is 
refused and denounced. If the players of this new world are any 
happier or better, it is only due to their condition of inactivity: 
they "sacrifice" their desire for the express purpose of refusing 
to enter into the conflict of a mimetic identification. They 
confront their rival and "fall" ("tombe et s'amortit"). This is 
the world of the "wise" person who withdraws from the angry 
mob and refuses to answer his enemy's threats. And intersub-
jective rivalry is created between the subjects of this ideal world 
(Rousseau's very "natural" order) and the subjects of our world 
(the corrupt social order). Their common object, however, 
remains the reader's moral and political esteem. And Rousseau 
awards that esteem to his fictitious universe by "sacralizing" the 
subjects of his ideal world. He achieves this by turning them 
into victims. In the real world of "unhappy humans" men are 
torn apart by reciprocal violence. In the ideal world, men are 
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"saved" through sacrifice by refusing violence, by turning the 
other cheek: 
L'etat celeste auquel ils aspirent et qui fait leur premier beson par la force 
avec laquelle il s'offre a leurs coeurs leur fait rassembler et tendre sans cesse 
toutes les puissances de leur ame pour y parvenir. Les obstacles qui les 
retiennent ne sauraient les occuper au point de le leur faire oublier un 
moment, et de la ce mortel degout pour tout le reste, et cette inaction totale quand 
ils desesperent d'atteindre au seul objet de tous leurs voeux. (Dialogue, 670, my 
italics) 
Finally, Rousseau coldly designates them as victims: 
. . . dans ces contrees . . . l'expresse volonte de nuire, la haine envenimee, 
l'envie, la noirceur, la trahison, la fourberie y sont inconnues; trop souvent 
on y voit des coupables, jamais on n \y vit un mechant. (Dialogue, 671, my italics) 
It should come to no surprise then that the author of Rous-
seau: juge de Jean-Jacques has by now incorporated the skeletal 
outline of the sacrificial mechanism in the founding of society, 
since this work, more than any other, shows Rousseau at the 
height of his own delusions of victimization. The importance 
Rousseau assigns to a violence based on "social passions," that 
is, on mimetic desire, having been made apparent by studying 
the three texts in question, raises questions that Girard seems 
better able to address than Freud. Although Derrida's objec-
tives go well beyond a reading of Rousseau's Essai—in fact, Part 
II of De la grammatologieis not so much a reading of Rousseau as 
Rousseau's text becomes a reading of Derrida—the critic's 
Freudian perspective of the Festival episode nevertheless leaves 
us with an interpretation that equates the scene with a nostalgic 
quest for an impossible, unobtainable originary presence. My 
reading has attempted to suggest or point to a location in 
Rousseau's writings that allows the reader to "complete the 
description" of the festival, to complete Rousseau's theory of 
culture. This locus has been found at the crossroads of identity 
and difference, of identity as difference caught in the throes of a 
crisis of indifferentiation. We are indeed still a great distance 
from a Girardian theory of culture. But Rousseau's contribu-
tion to the study of society, violence, and human desire should 
no longer go unnoticed or be misconstrued as a precursor to 
Freudian mythology. 
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